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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
William J. Lester appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon a jury 
verdict of guilty of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In 2008, K.A.M. (born  lived with her father most of the time, but spent 
every other weekend at her mother's house in Eagle, Idaho, where her mother's 
boyfriend, William Lester ("Lester"), also lived.1 (Tr., Vol. 5, p.32, Ls.10-22; p.37, L.16-
p.38, L.23; p.121, Ls.16-24.) K.A.M. had two half sisters, E.S. (five years old at the time 
of retrial), and A.G. (seventeen at the time of retrial), but they did not live with K.A.M. 
and her father. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.33, Ls.9-11; p.34, Ls.24-25.) 
One "stay-home" day when K.A.M. was eight years old, she was at her mother's 
home during the daytime with E.S., when Lester told K.A.M. to go into his (and K.A.M.'s 
mother's) bedroom, and that they were going to make candy for K.A.M.'s mother. (Tr., 
Vol. 5, p.41, L.7 p.43, L.4.) After Lester followed K.A.M. into his bedroom, he tied a 
cloth blindfold over her eyes, preventing her from seeing anything. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.43, 
L.13 - p.44. L.5.) K.A.M. thought the bedroom door was closed before she was 
blindfolded, and after Lester blindfolded her, he sat down and told her they were making 
candy for her mother, and gave her some lotion. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.44, Ls.10-25.) K.A.M. 
had seen a container of lotion on the bedroom dresser before she was blindfolded, and 
1 K.A.M.'s parents divorced in 2003. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.132, Ls.4-5.) 
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described it as "round and in a circle, like a jar that is open on the top. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.45, 
L.18 - p.46, L.5.) 
After Lester put K.A.M.'s hand into the lotion container, he had her rub lotion, 
using both hands, up and down on what she recognized to be his "private," which she 
said "was up towards the ceiling and it felt like skin, and it was kind of bumpy." (Tr., Vol. 
5, p.47, Ls.4-23; p.48, Ls.11-13; p.49, L.11 - p.50, L.7.) K.A.M. further described the 
body part Lester had her rub with lotion as being shaped like a finger, but bigger. (Tr., 
Vol. 5, p.47, L.24 - p.48, L.4.) When Lester told K.A.M. to "suck on it and bite it," she 
complied. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.50, Ls.12-18.) When she was biting him, Lester said, "Don't 
bite too hard." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.50, Ls.19-24.) At some point, the sexual contact "just 
stopped," and when Lester took the blindfold off K.A.M., she saw that he had all of his 
clothes on. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.51, Ls.3-9.) 
K.A.M. did not tell anyone about what Lester had done to her until August of 
2009 when she was alone with her older sister, A.G., while visiting at A.G.'s 
grandmother's house. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.54, L.23 - p.57, L.20; p.83, Ls.8-14; p.97, L.23 -
p.99, L.23.) Because K.A.M. and A.G.'s mother was in jail at that time, A.G. waited until 
she was released from jail, about a week or two, before telling her mother what K.A.M. 
had disclosed. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.100, Ls.7-23.) On August 22, 2009, Boise Police Officer 
Adam Crist responded to a call by K.A.M.'s mother to go to a residence in Boise, where 
he contacted K.A.M.'s mother and K.A.M., and took an initial report before switching the 
call to the Ada County Sheriff's Office because the incident reported had occurred 
outside Boise City. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.2, L.10- p.13, L.22.) 
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Lester was charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, 
one count for oral-genital contact with E.S., and one count for oral-genital and manual-
genital contact with K.A.M. (R., pp.15-17.) During the initial jury trial, E.S. was unable 
to testify while on the witness stand, and the district court declared a mistrial. (R., p.96; 
Tr., Vol. 3, p.219, L.9 - p.225, L.24.) After a new trial date was set (R., pp.99-100), 
Lester was tried in regard to the count involving K.A.M. as a victim, and convicted by a 
jury of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. (R., pp.135, 144). The court imposed 
a unified 20-year sentence with five years fixed. (R., pp.164-168.) Lester filed a 
"Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and for Leave" (R., p.176), which was denied 
(Mem. Dec. and Order Re: Rule 35; see this Court's 6/20/11 "Order"). Lester timely 
appealed. (R., pp.171-174.) 
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ISSUES 
Lester states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Lester's Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to confrontation at trial, when the 
court refused to permit Mr. Lester to recross examine K.A.M. in light 
of the line of questioning and her specific responses that were 
brought out during the State's re-direct examination? 
2. Did the prosecutor in this case commit misconduct during closing 
arguments by asking the jury to draw an adverse inference against 
Mr. Lester based upon his exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent? 
3. Does the cumulative effect of these errors require reversal of Mr. 
Lester's judgment of conviction and sentence? 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Lester failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by refusing 
to allow Lester to engage in recross-examination of K.AM.? 
2. Has Lester failed to establish his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was 
violated by the prosecutor's closing argument because Lester was not silent? 





Lester Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing 
To Allow Him To Engage In Recross-Examination Of K.A.M. 
A. Introduction 
At the end of the state's redirect-examination of K.A.M., the prosecutor asked her 
a series of questions about what could happen if she lied as a witness, as follows: 
Q. Okay. You know, [defense counsel] earlier on asked you 
what you thought could happen if a person - if you lied, for 
instance, in the courtroom. 
Do you remember that - those questions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, when he asked you, do you think that the Judge could 
put you in jail, you shrugged your shoulders. Did I get that 
right? Did you go like this -
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And so is it possible - in your brain, do you think it's 
possible for a person to go to jail if they lie in court? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. You're just not sure whether he would do that to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But I know I would be in big trouble. 




Q. Do you think these grownups can tell if you you're [sic] lying? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you think Judge Owen can tell if you're lying? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., Vol. 5, p.91, L.2 - p.92, L.7.) 
After Lester's attorney asked if he could "inquire," the trial judge said: "typically I 
don't allow recross, and I didn't. You had a full opportunity to cross-examine. So we 
had direct, cross-examination and redirect." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.92, Ls.21-24.) After the 
judge invited counsel to make a record of his objection, Lester's attorney made an offer 
of proof that he "would have asked the child if she had ever told a lie before," and 
explained that he had been allowed to ask that question in the first trial, and that the 
prosecutor's "redirect, talking about what would happen if [K.A.M.] told a lie in court, 
reintroduced the question of her telling a lie."2 (Tr., Vol. 5, p.92, L.24 - p.93, L.10.) The 
judge denied Lester's request to conduct recross-examination with K.A.M., stating that 
counsel could have asked K.A.M. the proposed question on cross-examination, but did 
not. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.94, Ls.1-17.) 
Although Lester's trial attorney argued that he be permitted to conduct recross-
examination with K.A.M. for the purpose of asking her whether she had ever lied before, 
on appeal Lester contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied him the 
opportunity to conduct recross-examination of K.A.M in order to ask her about her 
2 Lester's trial attorney implied that he forgot to ask K.A.M. during cross-examination 
whether she had ever lied. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.93, Ls.19-22 ("And if by inadvertence 
somebody forgets to ask a question .... ").) 
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testimony during the state's re-direct examination that "she believed all adults would 
know if she were telling a lie."3 (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Lester argues: 
The State at Mr. Lester's trial opened up a new line of questioning 
of the alleged victim in this case regarding whether this victim was telling 
the truth because she believed that all adults would know if she were 
telling a lie. Notwithstanding the fact that this testimony went to the heart 
of the credibility contest that was the core issue within this case, and 
despite the fact that this line of questioning only arose during the State's 
re-direct examination of K.A.M., the district court refused to permit Mr. 
Lester to re-cross examine K.A.M. on this issue. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) In short, Lester claims the district court erred by not permitting 
his trial attorney to conduct recross-examination with K.A.M. in regard to her "belief that 
all adults would be able to know she was lying if she were to tell a lie."4 (Appellant's 
Brief, p.14.) 
This Court should refuse to consider Lester's argument that the district court 
abused its discretion by denying trial counsel's request to recross-examine K.A.M. 
about her belief that "all adults" (see fn.3, supra) can tell when she is truthful because 
that issue was not presented to the trial court. Instead, Lester's trial attorney requested 
that he be allowed to ask K.A.M. if she had ever told a lie. Moreover, the questions that 
supposedly "opened the door" to recross-examination cited by Lester on appeal are not 
entitled to ask K.A.M. in a recross-examination, and the prosecutor's questions he 
3 On appeal, Lester states that K.A.M. testified she believed that "all adults" or "any 
adult" would know if she were telling a lie. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.10 ("all adults"), 12 
("any adult"), 14 ("all adults").) However, K.A.M. merely answered "yes" when asked if 
she thought "grown-ups can tell if you you're [sic] lying." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.92, Ls.2-4.) 
4 Lester acknowledges his trial counsel argued that "the State opened the door for him 
to ask K.A.M. whether she had ever lied to adults in the past." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) 
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claims "opened the door" to recross-examination, are not the same as those presented 
to the trial court, Lester has failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 
Regardless of whether Lester's claim has been preserved for appeal, the 
prosecution did not open the door to any new line of questioning or matter that 
warranted recross-examination of K.A.M. To the contrary, it was Lester's own attorney, 
during cross-examination of K.A.M., who opened the line of questions by asking K.A.M. 
what would happen if she didn't tell the truth, and if there was any way the trial judge 
would know if she was telling the truth or not. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.65, L.14 - p.66, L.16.) 
Further, the different questions Lester's trial and appellate counsel assert should have 
been asked on recross-examination of K.A.M. would have had, at best, only marginal 
relevance to K.A.M.'s credibility. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Lester's request to conduct recross-examination of K.A.M. about whether (as 
requested by trial counsel) she had "ever told a lie before" (Tr., Vol. 5, p.93, Ls.1-2), or 
(as requested by Lester on appeal) to ask about her "belief that all adults would be able 
to know" if she was lying (Appellant's Brief, p.14). 
B. Standard Of Review 
judge. State v. Rauch, 144 Idaho 682, 685, 168 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 2007). A 
decision to admit or deny evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear 
showing of abuse of that discretion. kl When a trial court's discretionary decision is 
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) 
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
8 
the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower 
court reached its decision by exercise of reason . .kl 
C. Lester Has Failed To Preserve This Issue For Appeal 
It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must 
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal. State v. 
Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. 
Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000)). Moreover, I.R.E. 
103(a)(1) requires "a party opposing proffered evidence" to "make a timely objection 
stating the specific ground of objection unless the specific ground is apparent from the 
context." Id. "An objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and different 
basis for excluding the evidence." Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho at 885, 119 P .3d at 660 
(citing State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. 
Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452,454,849 P.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App. 1993)). 
On appeal, Lester claims the district court erred by not permitting his trial 
attorney to conduct recross-examination with K.A.M. in regard to her "belief that all 
adults would be able to know she was lying if she were to tell a lie." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.14.) However, that request was not made by Lester's attorney during trial. Instead, 
Lester's attorney made an offer of proof that he "would have asked the child if she had 
ever told a lie before." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.92, L.24 - p.93, L.10.) Additionally, the sole 
explanation offered on appeal for how the door was opened for recross-examination of 
K.A.M. is that the prosecutor asked her during redirect examination if "she believed that 
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all adults would know if she were telling a lie." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Once more, 
that ground is not the same as was presented by Lester's trial counsel -- he claimed the 
prosecutor opened the door by "talking about what would happen if [K.A.M.] told a lie in 
court." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.93, Ls. 7-10.) Because Lester did not argue at trial what he now 
argues on appeal in regard to either the questions sought to be asked in recross-
examination of K.A.M., or the testimony that "opened the door" to such recross-
examination, he has failed to preserve this issue, and this Court should not consider it. 
D. Lester Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion Or 
Violated Lester's Right To Confrontation When It Denied His Request To 
Conduct Recross-Examination Of K.A.M. By Asking Whether She Had Ever Lied 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 611 (b) provides: "Cross-examination should be limited to 
the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the 
witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional 
matters as if on direct examination." "The appropriate scope of cross-examination 
includes not only the facts testified to on direct examination, but other facts connected 
with those facts, directly or indirectly, tending to explain, modify, or qualify the 
inferences resulting from the direct examination." Rauch, 144 Idaho at 685, 168 P .3d at 
1032. in regard to recross-exarninaUon, the idaho Suprerne Cowt has expiained: 
While it is true that when new evidence is elicited on redirect 
examination, the opposing party must be given the right of recross-
examination on the new material, such is not the case here. Our 
examination of the record discloses no new evidence that was opened up 
on redirect examination. The court did not err in not permitting recross-
examination by the four defense attorneys. 
State v. Miles, 97 Idaho 396, 399, 545 P.2d 484, 487 (1976) [footnote omitted], 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981); 
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see State v. Faulkner, 381 N.E.2d 934, 936-937 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1978) (citing Miles in 
support of statement, "We hold that where ... no new matters are explored on redirect 
examination, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny defense counsel's 
request to conduct a re-cross-examination." ). Similarly, although the Sixth Amendment 
guaranteed Lester an opportunity to impeach the witnesses against him, the right is not 
unlimited. As explained in United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1370-
1371 (11 th Cir. 1994): 
The Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants an 
opportunity to impeach through cross-examination the testimony of 
witnesses for the prosecution. [Citations omitted.] As discussed . . . 
above, however, this right is not unlimited. Trial judges retain wide latitude 
to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns 
about, among other things, confusion of the issues or interrogation that is 
repetitive or only marginally relevant. [Delaware v.] Van Arsda/1, 475 U.S. 
[673] at 679 [1986] ... ; see Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 ... 
(1988). Such restrictions are reviewed solely for abuse of discretion. See, 
e.g., United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770, 775 (11 th Cir. 1989). A 
defendant's confrontation rights are satisfied when the cross-examination 
permitted exposes the jury to facts sufficient to evaluate the credibility of 
the witness and enables defense counsel to establish a record from which 
he properly can argue why the witness is less than reliable. United States 
v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1554 (11 th Cir. 1991); see [United States v.] 
Sheffield, 992 F.2d [1164] at 1168 [11 th Cir. 1993]. 
There was no abuse of discretion here, under either I.RE. 611 (b) or the Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause. The prosecutor's redirect of K.A.M. did not 
produce any new subject area or material which opened the door for Lester's trial 
attorney to ask K.A.M. on recross-examination whether she had ever lied, or to inquire 
about her belief that adults can tell when she is lying. The following colloquy reveals 
that during his cross-examination of K.AM., Lester's trial attorney asked her what would 
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happen if she did not testify truthfully, and if the trial judge (vis-a-vis adults) would be 
able to know if she was being truthful: 
Q. What do you think would happen to you if you didn't tell us the 
truth? 
A I would get in very big trouble. 
Q. And what kind of trouble would that be? 
A Big, big trouble. 
Q. What does that mean to you? 
A I would be gone for a long time from my dad, and I would get in 
trouble from the Judge. 
Q. What do you think the Judge would do to you? 
A I don't know. 
Q. Do you think he'd put you in jail? 
A I don't know. 
Q. And would it be fair to say that the Judge - there's no way for the 
Judge to know whether you're really telling the truth or not; is that 
right? 
THE WITNESS: Can you please ask the question again? 
Q. . .. Yeah. There's no real way for the Judge to know whether 
you're telling the truth or not, is there? 
A I don't know. 
Q. Because he doesn't - he wasn't there in parts of your life that you 
would be telling him about, right? 
A Yes. 
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(Tr., Vol. 5, p.65, L.14- p.66, L.16.) 
As shown from K.A.M.'s testimony, Lester's attorney asked her what would 
happen to her if she did not testify truthfully, and whether the trial judge would know if 
she was being truthful. The first question - what would happen to her if she was 
untruthful - is how Lester's trial attorney alleged the prosecutor opened the door to 
recross-examination of K.A.M. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.93, Ls.7-10 ("talking about what would 
happen if she told a lie in court, reintroduced the question of her telling a lie.") Plainly, it 
was Lester's trial attorney who asked that question first. 
In regard to the latter question, on redirect examination, the prosecutor asked 
K.A.M. whether she believed that "grownups" can tell if you are lying, and she answered 
"yes." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.92, Ls.2-4.) The thrust of the question by Lester's attorney and the 
prosecutor is the same, the only difference being that one is about "grownups" while the 
other concerns the trial judge. Lester's argument that the prosecutor's redirect 
questions opened up a new line of questions is belied by the record - Lester's own 
attorney ventured there first. 5 Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
ruling that because Lester's attorney could have asked K.A.M. during cross-examination 
whether she had ever told a lie, but did not, he could not do so on recross-examination. 
The applicable rule of evidence provides that cross-examination "should" be 
limited to the subject matter of direct examination and the credibility of the witness. The 
offer of proof made by Lester's trial counsel would not have added anything relevant to 
5 Rather than the prosecutor's questions opening a new area of inquiry justifying 
recross-examination of K.A.M., Lester's attorney's cross-examination of K.A.M. opened 
the door for the prosecutor to ask her if she believed "grownups" could tell if she was 
lying. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.92, Ls.2-3); see Rauch, 144 Idaho at 685, 168 P.3d at 1032; Miles, 
97 Idaho at 399, 545 P.2d at 487. 
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those issues. Asking K.A.M. whether she had ever told a lie would not have impeached 
her testimony that she believed adults could tell if she lied and would not have shown 
her to be incredible. If K.A.M. was asked if she had ever lied, and assuming she was 
not caught off-guard by the bluntness and obviousness of such a question, a "yes" 
answer would have been the only reasonable response. Conversely, a "no" answer 
would only serve to show that K.A.M., a child, misunderstood what such a blatant 
question intended. If, as Lester appears to contend on appeal, his attorney should have 
been allowed to inquire into K.A.M.'s testimony about "all adults" being able to tell if she 
was being truthful, it is difficult to conceive how such recross-examination of K.A.M. 
would have discredited her testimony. 
Given the many questions K.A.M. fielded about her ability to tell the truth in court 
during every phase of her trial testimony, and the limited relevance of the question 
proposed by Lester's offer of proof (or the questions Lester claims, now on appeal, 
should have been asked) in yet a new round of questions in recross-examination, the 
district court was well within its discretion to curtail the questioning of K.A.M. -
especially since Lester's attorney had a full opportunity to ask those questions during 
cross-examination, and effectively did so. Lester has failed to demonstrate any abuse 
of discretion in the district court's refusal to allow his attorney to conduct recross-
examination of K.A.M. 
Finally, even if the trial court erred in denying Lester's trial counsel the 
opportunity to conduct recross-examination of K.A.M., such error constitutes harmless 
error. For the reasons stated above, the recross-examination of K.A.M. would have 
been, at best, only marginally relevant to the jury's determination of K.A.M.'s credibility. 
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(See § D, supra, pp.10-15 and n.6.) Therefore, this Court can conclude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the alleged error did not contribute to Lester's conviction. State 
v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 522, 708 P.2d 921, 927 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 
11. 
Lester Has Failed To Establish His Fifth Amendment Right To Remain Silent Was 
Violated By The Prosecutor's Closing Argument Because Lester Was Not Silent 
A. Introduction 
Lester argues on appeal that the prosecutor's closing argument violated the 
exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, by, over his objection, asking the 
jury to "consider [his] pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of his 
consciousness of guilt. "6 (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-15.) 
Lester's Fifth Amendment claim fails because he did not remain silent. Contrary 
to his argument, Lester made voluntary statements during a full interview with the 
investigating detective.7 The prosecutor's closing arguments regarding Lester's 
statements and testimony were proper references to what he said, not impermissible 
comments on his "silence." 
6 Lester fails to point out where the record demonstrates that he exercised his Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent, or where the record reflects his arrest or his being 
given Miranda warnings. (See generally, Appellant's Brief, pp.14-18.) 
7 Although Lester specifically claims that his right to remain silent was violated during 
the pre-arrest, pre-Miranda, stage, it should be noted that in addition to voluntarily 
submitting to the out-of-custody interview by the detective, he also testified at both of his 
trials. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Whether the admission of evidence violates a defendant's right to remain silent is 
a constitutional question reviewed de nova. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820, 965 
P.2d 174, 180 (1998). Appellate courts conduct a two-tiered inquiry to review 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. First, the court determines whether the alleged 
misconduct was improper. If the court concludes that the conduct was improper, the 
court must then consider whether such misconduct resulted in prejudice to the 
defendant or was harmless error. State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 
1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. Lester Has Failed To Establish A Due Process Violation 
Although it is a due process violation to present evidence of a defendant's pre- or 
post-Miranda silence to infer guilt, Moore, 131 Idaho at 820, 965 P.2d at 180 and State 
v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296, 62 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 2003), it is axiomatic that a defendant 
must actually remain silent in order to invoke Miranda's protections. Lester has not 
shown where or when he even attempted to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent prior to his arrest. More importantly, the record makes plain that Lester 
voluntarily decided not to be silent. 
After K.A.M. was interviewed by "CARES," Ada County Sheriffs Detective Cherie 
Tucker left a voice message on Lester's phone, and when he called her back, she told 
him "that his name had come up in an investigation and [she] needed to speak with him 
.... " (Tr., Vol. 5, p.141, Ls.10-19; p.149, Ls.2-20.) On September 29, 2009, Lester 
went to the Sheriffs Office on his own, and, after Detective Tucker told him he was free 
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to leave and did not have to answer any questions, he agreed to be interviewed. (Tr., 
Vol. 5, p.150, L.2 - p.151, L.10.) Detective Tucker then interviewed Lester in an 
interview room at the Sheriff's office for about 44 minutes; first about preliminary 
matters, then progressing to the specific allegations made by K.A.M., which Lester 
consistently denied. (Tr., Vol. 5, p.151, L.11 - p.157, L.1; p.192, L.22 - p.193, L.5; 
p.194, L.18- p.197, L.6; Tr., Vol. 6, p.41, Ls.15-23; St.'s Ex. 1.) 
Lester asserts that the prosecutor's closing argument "impermissibly referred to 
Lester's pre-Miranda silence by arguing to the jury that Lester did not "seek out law 
enforcement and confess his guilt." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Lester's argument cannot 
survive the fact that he did not remain silent, but chose instead to voluntarily talk about 
K.A.M.'s allegations with Detective Tucker, seemingly without reservation, and did so at 
length. "A defendant cannot have it both ways. If he talks, what he says or omits is to 
be judged on its merits or demerits, and not on some artificial standard that only the part 
that helps him can be later referred to." Vitali v. United States, 383 F.2d 121, 123 (1 st 
Cir. 1967); see United States v. Vargas, 580 F.3d 274, 277 n.1 (5th Cir. 2009) (Vargas 
"answered several questions after the Miranda warnings had been given, making fair 
game both his answers and omissions."). Because Lester voluntarily gave statements 
to Detective Tucker duiing an interview prior to his arrest, he plainly chose not to 
exercise his Fifth Amendment right to silence at that time. 
The prosecutor's reference to Lester's affirmative statements can hardly be 
considered equivalent to an impermissible reference to silence. The prosecutor told the 
jury it would know that Lester sexually molested K.A.M. only "because of what you hear 
from her," and "[n]ot because he ran out and felt guilty and told anybody about it and 
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then wanted to be found out." (Tr., Vol. 5, p.26, Ls.12-14) The prosecutor's very next 
comment -- "[i]n fact, it was quite the opposite" - reasonably spoke to the fact that, in his 
interview with Detective Tucker, Lester denied sexually molesting K.A.M. The 
prosecutor's comment did not - nor could it -- target a non-existent "exercise" of 
Lester's right to silence. 
In sum, because Lester did not remain silent, the prosecutor's comments were 
related to his statements, not his silence. It was not improper for the prosecutor to 
discuss what Lester's statements did, or did not, disclose. As the prosecutor correctly 
pointed out, Lester failed to admit his offense, not by being silent, but by denying any 
wrongdoing during his interview with Detective Tucker. Lester has failed to demonstrate 
that the prosecutor's closing argument amounted to an impermissible reference to 
Lester's (alleged) pre-Miranda exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to silence. 
Further, because Lester responded to Detective Tucker's first request to be 
interviewed, and during that interview he clearly denied any wrongdoing toward K.A.M., 
the jury would not have drawn any inference of guilt from Lester's failure to discuss the 
matter with the detective (or law enforcement) prior to the arranged interview. No 
rational juror would have concluded that Lester's "silence" before his interview with the 
detective was an indication of his guiii. Therefore, this Court can conciude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the alleged error did not contribute to Lester's conviction. 
Darbin, 109 Idaho at 522, 708 P.2d at 927 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). 
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111. 
Lester Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To This Case 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 
125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to application of 
the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 
P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Lester has failed to show that two or more errors occurred in 
his trial, and therefore the doctrine is inapplicable to this case. See, e.g., LaBelle v. 
State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial 
had been shown, they would not amount to a denial of due process that would require 
reversal. State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State 
v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of 
errors deemed harmless). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Lester's conviction and 
sentence for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. 
DATED this 1in day of September 2011. 
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